The complicated conceptions of human personality
Therefore we cannot agree with Piaget, for example, when he declares that: As a psychologist I absolutely object to the fact — and I think all men of science in all disciplines are with me on this point — that the representatives of a different domain explain to me what my domain is, and to the fact that in the name of a philosophy above science they set limits to it, saying: this is what mathematics is and what it is not, this is what psychology is and what it is not.
But then the duality of readings of this single text remains contingent in the last analysis and consequently will only be provisional.
If need itself is a historico-social product, this means not only that it is not the basis of psychic activity but that it is this activity itself which plays the part of a basis with regard to it.
Personality psychology pdf
For example, while your personality might lead you to be shy in social situations, an emergency might lead you to take on a more outspoken and take-charge approach. Although personality is generally stable, it can be influenced by the environment. Because for concepts to be able to play the fundamental part of basic concepts in a science, it is not enough for them to describe and classify in a more or less satisfactory way the phenomena most frequently observed; much more, they have to express in themselves or in their relations with one another the determinant contradictions which characterise the essence of its object. This vicious circle of unpardonable negligence is made worse by three sorts of unchallengeable facts. The fully developed character of a science is a precise, objective, provable fact. In short, it is the whole basic demarcation of the human sciences in the domain of the psychism of individuals which is so radically problematic. Until recently, this contradiction did not appear to concern many people: in spite of many signs of the presence of vital unresolved questions and some stimulating bases of such a theory did not develop, at least not in French Marxist publications. The problem is simply to make them coincide. Indeed, would this not be a leftover of the outmoded psychology of faculties, which the science of personality is expected to dissolve?
These elements make it possible with some chance of success to try to identify the fundamental laws of development of the object studied and, through this, lead on to mastering it in theory and practice, which is the goal of the whole scientific enterprise.
Each technique has its own strengths and weaknesses. And L.
In the past certain exponents of Pavlovism have supported this liquidationist point of view with regard to all psychology, understood as a basically autonomous science in relation to the physiology of nervous activity.
Clear basic concepts and sharply drawn definitions are only possible in the mental sciences in so far as the latter seek to fit a region of facts into the frame of a logical system.
Psychology terms for personality
An association is made between a behavior and a consequence for that behavior. Does it not go against the deeply rooted idea that, on the contrary, from a Marxist standpoint, what belongs to psychology is necessarily of minor importance? Indeed, is it not a foolish venture from the outset to get involved in such a task if one is a philosopher, i. One can try to map out the boundary in three ways, which exhaust all the theoretical possibilities and which nevertheless all seemingly lead to an impasse. Unless I am mistaken the concepts of activity presently used by the various psychological theories, such as behaviour, structure, role, etc. Clinical research relies upon information gathered from clinical patients over the course of treatment. It is Freud himself, for example, who, not in a text of his youth but in the autobiography which he drafted at the age of sixty-five, when the greatest part of his work was behind him, wrote that: I have repeatedly heard it said contemptuously that it is impossible to take a science seriously whose most general concepts are as lacking in precision as those of libido and of instinct in psychoanalysis. But then the duality of readings of this single text remains contingent in the last analysis and consequently will only be provisional. There are, of course, many things to say in reply to Sartre — many have been said, and I will come back to them. The politics of monopoly capital are therefore bound up here in a pedagogic in the grand style. In short, while there is nothing in psychism which is not nervous activity it is nevertheless clearly necessary for it to be distinguished from it in some way, at least if one is to grant psychology a specific object. In every new science one can usually observe a profusion of evocative and ill-founded generalisation, and of ambitious and stillborn theories: shortcomings of youth, of course, but, at the same time, striking signs of life, beginnings which are delusive but highly necessary for what will be the fully-developed science of tomorrow.
Ale concept of need is straight away articulable with historical materialism, and indeed this is undoubtedly why it is generally disparaged and even ruled out by vulgar psychological idealism.
The id is responsible for needs and urges, while the superego regulates ideals and morals.
An Incomplete Science In short, while the idea might at first be surprising, it is not difficult, however, to show that the theory of personality is also of the utmost importance for Marxism itself — even if this raises a number of questions which will have to be gone into carefully.
This is a valid test. If one believes it can it seems that this is so in particular because the early stages of individual development are controlled and rythmed by cycles of satisfaction and reproduction of needs; nothing is more current in psychology today than to regard what is or appears to be basic in the initial stage of psychic ontogenesis as being the general basis of all developed psychism, i.
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